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O P I N I ON  
   
 
 
ROTH, Circuit Judge: 
 
 After overhearing the murder of his two next-door 
neighbors and facing repeated threats from local gang 
members for his perceived role in assisting law enforcement, 
petitioner Brayan Antonio Guzman Orellana left his home in 
El Salvador and entered the United States seeking relief 
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pursuant to the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) and the 
Convention Against Torture (CAT).  The Immigration Judge 
(IJ) denied his application, and the Board of Immigration 
Appeals (BIA) dismissed his appeal.  We must now decide 
three issues:  (1) whether persons who publicly provide 
assistance to law enforcement against major Salvadoran gangs 
constitute a cognizable particular social group for purposes of 
asylum and withholding of removal under the INA, (2) whether 
Guzman has established that he suffered past persecution on 
account of anti-gang political opinion imputed to him, and (3) 
whether the BIA correctly applied the framework we 
enunciated in Myrie v. Attorney General1 in denying Guzman 
relief under the CAT.  For the reasons that follow, we hold that 
persons who publicly provide assistance against major 
Salvadoran gangs do constitute a particular social group, that 
Guzman has failed to meet his burden to show that imputed 
anti-gang political opinion was a central reason for the 
treatment he received, and that the BIA erred in its application 
of Myrie to Guzman’s application.  Accordingly, we will 
vacate the BIA’s decision and remand this case for further 
proceedings on Guzman’s petition for relief from removal. 
 
I.  BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
Guzman is a native of El Salvador.  He grew up in a 
neighborhood controlled by Mara Salvatrucha, a gang 
commonly known as MS-13.  On October 5, 2017, when 
Guzman was 18 years old, his two next-door neighbors were 
murdered.  Earlier that night, a member of MS-13 had warned 
Guzman’s family “not to speak to or call the police regarding 
 
1 855 F.3d 509 (3d Cir. 2017). 
 4 
 
whatever [they] saw or heard in the next couple of hours.”2  
Shortly thereafter, Guzman overheard the murder as it took 
place.   
 
About a week later, the police visited Guzman’s 
neighborhood and, in front of Guzman’s house, questioned him 
about his missing neighbors.  Fearing that harm would come to 
him and his family if he cooperated with the police, Guzman 
told them that he knew nothing.  However, Teco, a former 
classmate of Guzman’s and an MS-13 member who may have 
been involved in the murder, witnessed Guzman talking to the 
police.  At the end of the conversation, the police climbed over 
the wall between Guzman’s house and his neighbors’ and 
discovered the neighbors’ bodies in their backyard. 
 
A few days after Guzman was seen with the police, 
Teco and four other MS-13 members ambushed and attacked 
him on his way home from school.  Teco made it clear that they 
did so because they believed Guzman was a “snitch.”3  
Guzman, bruised from the encounter, left his home the next 
day to stay with his aunt who lived an hour away.  A few days 
later, Guzman, again on his way home from school, was pulled 
into an alley by Teco and another MS-13 member named 
Pelón.  Pelón put a gun to Guzman’s head and told him he had 
to “cooperate with the gang.”4  Guzman refused but was 
ultimately let go. 
 
After this second encounter, Guzman decided that he 
was no longer safe in El Salvador due to the pervasive gang 
 
2 Administrative Record (AR) 722–23. 
3 Id. at 727. 
4 Id. at 728. 
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presence there.  He fled the country in November 2017 and 
applied for admission when he entered the United States a 
month later.  The Department of Homeland Security detained 
him and served him with a Notice to Appear charging him as 
being removable for failing to present any valid document 
required for entry.5  Guzman filed an application for asylum 
and withholding of removal under the INA and for deferral or 
withholding of removal under the CAT.  In support of his 
application for relief under the INA, he claimed that he had 
suffered past persecution in El Salvador and that, if removed, 
there was a clear probability that his life or freedom would be 
threatened on account of his imputed membership in the 
particular social group of “complaining witnesses against 
major Salvadoran gangs” and his imputed anti-gang political 
opinion.  
 
In support of his application for relief under the CAT, 
Guzman claimed that it is more likely than not that he would 
be subject to torture or death if returned to El Salvador, citing 
the fact that MS-13 members in his neighborhood knew him 
and had been looking for him.  His application was 
supplemented by an affidavit from a licensed clinical social 
worker who interviewed him about the series of events 
involving the murder and diagnosed him with Post-Traumatic 
Stress Disorder (PTSD). 
 
The IJ denied Guzman’s application despite finding 
Guzman to be credible.  The IJ first held that Guzman was not 
eligible for relief under the INA because he could not show that 
he suffered past persecution or that his life or freedom would 
be threatened on either ground he had asserted.  According to 
 
5 Guzman is still being detained. 
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the IJ, Guzman was not a “complaining witness” since he did 
not provide any information to or file a complaint with the 
police and since imputed membership in a particular social 
group is insufficient for purposes of seeking relief under the 
INA.  In addition, the IJ stated that Guzman presented no 
evidence suggesting that MS-13 deemed his actions to be an 
expression of anti-gang political opinion.  The IJ then held that 
Guzman was also ineligible for relief under the CAT after 
finding that it was not more likely than not that Guzman would 
be tortured upon returning to El Salvador and that Guzman had 
not established that the Salvadoran government consented to 
or acquiesced in gang violence against Salvadorans. 
 
The BIA dismissed Guzman’s appeal.  With respect to 
Guzman’s application for relief under the INA, it held that 
“complaining witnesses against major Salvadoran gangs” do 
not constitute a particular social group and that Guzman failed 
to show that he was targeted by MS-13 on account of any 
imputed political opinion.  With respect to Guzman’s 
application for relief under the CAT, the BIA affirmed the IJ’s 
determination that Guzman was not likely to be subject to 
torture upon removal but did not discuss whether the 
Salvadoran government would consent to or acquiesce in any 
torture Guzman might suffer upon removal.  Guzman 
petitioned this Court for review of the BIA’s final order of 
removal, arguing that the BIA erred in concluding that (1) he 
was not an imputed member of a particular social group, (2) he 
was not persecuted on account of his political opinion, and (3) 
he was not eligible for relief under the CAT. 
 
II.  DISCUSSION 
We have jurisdiction over this timely petition for review 
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of a final order of removal under 8 U.S.C. §§ 1252(a)(1) and 
1252(b)(1).  Although our jurisdiction only extends to final 
orders of removal and thus only to decisions of the BIA,6 we 
also review the IJ’s decision to the extent it is adopted, 
affirmed, or substantially relied upon by the BIA.7 
 
We must resolve three issues in this appeal.  The first 
issue—whether persons who publicly provide assistance to law 
enforcement against major Salvadoran gangs constitute a 
particular social group for purposes of the INA—presents a 
mixed question of law and fact.  We review the BIA’s legal 
conclusion as to the existence of a particular social group de 
novo while reviewing its underlying factual conclusions for 
substantial evidence.8  The substantial evidence standard 
requires us to defer to factual findings below as long as they 
are supported by reasonable, substantial, and probative 
evidence on the record considered as a whole.9  However, 
deference is not due “where findings and conclusions are based 
on inferences or presumptions that are not reasonably 
grounded in the record, viewed as a whole,” and the BIA “is 
not permitted simply to ignore or misconstrue evidence.”10  
The second issue—whether Guzman has established that he 
suffered past persecution because of anti-gang political opinion 
 
6 Abdulai v. Ashcroft, 239 F.3d 542, 548–49 (3d Cir. 2001). 
7 Garcia v. Att’y Gen., 665 F.3d 496, 502 (3d Cir. 2011), as 
amended (Jan. 13, 2012); Camara v. Att’y Gen., 580 F.3d 196, 
201 (3d Cir. 2009), as amended (Nov. 4, 2009). 
8 See S.E.R.L. v. Att’y Gen., 894 F.3d 535, 542–43 (3d Cir. 
2018). 
9 Garcia, 665 F.3d at 502 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
10 Espinosa-Cortez v. Att’y Gen., 607 F.3d 101, 107 (3d Cir. 
2010) (internal quotations omitted). 
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imputed to him—presents a factual question subject to the 
substantial evidence standard.11  Finally, the third issue—
whether the BIA correctly applied Myrie to the instant case—
presents a mixed question of law and fact which we review 
under the same standards as the first issue.12   
 
A.  Guzman’s Application for Relief under the INA 
 To be eligible for asylum under the INA, an applicant 
must demonstrate refugee status by showing that he has 
suffered past persecution or has a well-founded fear of future 
persecution on account of his race, religion, nationality, 
membership in a particular social group, or political opinion.13  
A fear of future persecution is well-founded if there is a 
reasonable probability that persecution will occur, and a 
showing of past persecution creates a rebuttable presumption 
that the fear is well-founded.14  In addition, the applicant must 
establish that one of the five statutorily protected grounds “was 
or will be at least one central reason” for his persecution and 
 
11 See I.N.S. v. Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. 478, 481–84 (1992) 
(analyzing the causal connection between political opinion and 
persecution as a factual question); Cruz-Diaz v. I.N.S., 86 F.3d 
330, 331–32 (4th Cir. 1996), as amended (May 29, 1996) 
(same). 
12 See Kang v. Att’y Gen., 611 F.3d 157, 164 (3d Cir. 2010) 
(“[W]e will uphold the BIA’s reversal of the IJ’s grant of CAT 
relief if there is substantial evidence supporting the BIA’s 
conclusion that the IJ clearly erred in finding a likelihood of 
torture, or if we determine that the alleged mistreatment does 
not legally constitute torture.”). 
13 8 U.S.C. §§ 1158(b)(1)(A), 1101(a)(42)(A). 
14 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(b). 
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that the harm was caused by the government or by forces that 
the government is unable or unwilling to control.15  To be 
eligible for withholding of removal under the INA, which is a 
separate form of relief, the standard is higher still, as the 
applicant must demonstrate that there is a “clear probability” 
that, upon his removal, his life or freedom will be threatened 
on account of one of the protected grounds.16 
 
 Addressing Guzman’s first claim that he is eligible for 
asylum and withholding of removal under the INA on account 
of his imputed membership in a particular social group 
consisting of complaining witnesses against major Salvadoran 
gangs, we conclude that remand is appropriate.  To establish a 
particular social group, an applicant must show that it is “(1) 
composed of members who share a common immutable 
characteristic, (2) defined with particularity, and (3) socially 
distinct within the society in question.”17    After our review of 
the situation in El Salvador, we conclude that the group of 
persons, who publicly provide assistance to law enforcement 
against major Salvadoran gangs satisfies all three criteria and, 
thus, constitutes a particular social group.18 
 
15 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(i); Kibinda v. Att’y Gen., 477 F.3d 
113, 119 (3d Cir. 2007). 
16 Chen v. Gonzales, 434 F.3d 212, 216 (3d Cir. 2005) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
17 S.E.R.L., 894 F.3d at 547; see also Matter of M-E-V-G-, 26 
I. & N. Dec. 227, 237 
(BIA 2014). 
18 The government urges us to apply deference under Chevron 
U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 
(1984), to the BIA’s determination on this question, albeit with 
respect to Guzman’s formulation of the group.  However, 
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A shared common immutable characteristic can be “an 
innate one such as sex, color, or kinship ties, or in some 
circumstances . . . a shared past experience such as former 
military leadership or land ownership.”19  We held previously 
in Garcia v. Attorney General that persons who have assisted 
law enforcement against violent gangs that threaten 
communities in Guatemala share a common, immutable 
characteristic because they have the shared experience of 
assisting law enforcement, which is based on past conduct that 
cannot be undone and that they should not be asked to undo.20   
 
Garcia concerned a witness who testified in court about 
a gang-related murder.21  Since Guzman did not testify in court, 
the BIA considered his case to be distinguishable from Garcia.  
That is too narrow a reading.  In our analysis, it is 
indistinguishable whether someone testifies in court or 
publicly provides out of court assistance to law enforcement.  
In both circumstances, that person will have been visible to the 
public and is likely be targeted because of his cooperation.   
 
Chevron deference is inapplicable here because we are 
deciding as a matter of law whether our precedent—and that of 
other courts—forecloses relief for Guzman.  See Akins v. FEC, 
101 F.3d 731, 740 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (en banc) (“There is 
therefore no reason for courts—the supposed experts in 
analyzing judicial decisions—to defer to agency 
interpretations of the Court’s opinions.”), vacated on other 
grounds by FEC v. Akins, 524 U.S. 11 (1998). 
19 Matter of Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. 211, 233 (BIA 1985), 
overruled on different grounds, 19 I. & N. Dec. 439 (BIA 
1987). 
20 665 F.3d at 504. 
21 Id. at 500. 
 11 
 
In Garcia, we distinguished the witness who testified in 
court and whose identity was “known to her alleged 
persecutors” from “confidential informants whose aid to law 
enforcement was not public.”22  Here, Guzman did not 
communicate secretly with the police.  His ordeal began when 
he was seen in public being questioned by and talking to the 
police.  His identity was known to his persecutors just as it 
would be if he had testified in court.  The same logic that led 
to our conclusion in Garcia compels us now to hold that 
persons who publicly provide assistance to law enforcement 
against major Salvadoran gangs similarly share a common, 
immutable characteristic.   
 
A group consisting of persons who publicly provide 
assistance to law enforcement against major Salvadoran gangs 
is also defined with particularity.23  Particularity requires “a 
clear benchmark for determining who falls within the group”; 
a proposed group must “be discrete and have definable 
boundaries”—not “amorphous, overbroad, diffuse, or 
 
22 Id. at 504 n.5. 
23 The BIA in its decision addressed only the immutability and 
social distinction prongs of the particular social group test.  
Ordinarily, the proper course would be to remand to the BIA 
to determine whether the group we now define satisfies the 
particularity requirement.  However, “where application of the 
correct legal principles to the record could lead only to the 
same conclusion, there is no need to require agency 
reconsideration.”  Yusupov v. Att’y Gen., 650 F.3d 968, 993 (3d 
Cir. 2011) (internal quotation marks omitted).  The 
particularity requirement for this group we have defined 
presents such a case. 
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subjective.”24  Like a group of witnesses who have testified in 
court against violent gangs, a group of witnesses who have 
publicly provided assistance to law enforcement against major 
Salvadoran gangs “has definable boundaries and is equipped 
with a benchmark for determining who falls within it” 
sufficient to satisfy the particularity requirement.25   
 
Finally, this group is socially distinct within Salvadoran 
society.  To be socially distinct does not mean “ocular” 
visibility.  “[R]ather [the group] must be perceived as a group 
by society.”26  Providing assistance to law enforcement in 
public, like testifying in court, “lends itself to societal 
recognition,” since “all are readily aware of the group and its 
members, not just those that are being provided information.”27  
28  29   
We thus hold that a group consisting of witnesses who 
have publicly provided assistance to law enforcement against 
major Salvadoran gangs meets all three criteria for being a 
 
24 M-E-V-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. at 239. 
25 Radiowala v. Att’y Gen., 930 F.3d 577, 583 (3d Cir. 2019).  
26 M-E-V-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. at 240. 
27 See Radiowala, 930 F.3d at 583. 
28 Decreto No. 1029/2006, Ley Especial para la Proteccion de 
Victimas y Testigos [“Special Law for the Protection of 
Victims and Witnesses”], (May 11, 2006), at p. 2, available at 
https://www.asamblea.gob.sv/sites/default/files/documents/de
cretos/171117_072930683_archivo_documento_legislativo.p
df (stating that the law applies to victims, witness, or other 
persons who are at risk or in danger due to their direct or 
indirect intervention in the investigation of a crime). 
29 Henriquez-Rivas v. Holder, 707 F.3d 1081, 1092 (9th Cir. 
2013). 
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particular social group.  Our analysis remains the same even 
though Guzman did not actually provide information to the 
Salvadoran police.  Contrary to the IJ’s unsupported assertion, 
asylum and withholding of removal under the INA may be 
granted on the basis of imputed, not just actual, membership in 
a particular social group.30   
 
The BIA did not address several other elements of 
Guzman’s application for relief under the INA—including 
whether Guzman is an imputed member of the group we 
described; whether the harm that Guzman has suffered in El 
Salvador, or will with reasonable probability suffer, rises to the 
level of persecution; whether Guzman’s imputed membership 
in that group is a central reason for his persecution; whether 
the Salvadoran government is unable or unwilling to control 
MS-13; and whether it is clearly probable that Guzman’s life 
or freedom will be threatened upon removal.  We leave these 
matters to the BIA on remand.31   
 
 Addressing Guzman’s second argument that he is 
eligible for relief under the INA because he has been subject to 
persecution and has a well-founded fear of future persecution 
on account of his imputed anti-gang political opinion, the 
BIA’s determination that Guzman has failed to show 
persecution on account of political opinion is supported by 
substantial evidence.  It was not on account of his political 
opinions that he was persecuted but on account of his apparent 
cooperation with the police.  Guzman claims that anti-gang 
political opinion was attributed to him based on his perceived 
cooperation with the police and refusal to join MS-13.  In 
 
30 Amanfi v. Ashcroft, 328 F.3d 719, 729–30 (3d Cir. 2003). 
31 Cf. Garcia, 665 F.3d at 504.   
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determining whether an applicant was persecuted because of 
an imputed political opinion, we focus on whether “the 
persecutor attributed a political opinion to the victim, and acted 
upon the attribution.”32  However, Guzman presents no 
evidence indicating that Teco, Pelón, or the other MS-13 
members who battered him did so for any reason other than his 
perceived assistance to the police; nor is there evidence that 
any of them believed his refusal to join MS-13 was a political 
expression.  In addition, neither of the two statements made to 
Guzman—that Guzman was a snitch and that he needed to 
collaborate with the gang—appears to be politically motivated, 
suggesting that Guzman’s imputed political opinion was not a 
central reason for his treatment.  Because the evidence does not 
compel a contrary conclusion, we are not prepared to disturb 
the BIA’s ruling that Guzman failed to carry his burden.33   
 
32 Espinosa-Cortez, 607 F.3d at 108 (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
33 See Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. at 483 (rejecting the notion that 
an applicant must provide direct proof of his or her persecutor’s 
motives, but adding that “since the statute makes motive 
critical, [the applicant] must provide some evidence of 
[motive], direct or circumstantial”); Cruz-Diaz, 86 F.3d at 332 
(holding that the applicant’s refusal to join the guerrillas in El 
Salvador “does not compel the conclusion that [he] will be 
subjected to persecution or other harm based on actual or 
imputed opinion, any more than any other citizen of El 
Salvador who participated in or refused to participate in the 
activities of either the guerrillas or the army”); cf. Tilija v. Att’y 
Gen., 930 F.3d 165, 169–70, 172 (3d Cir. 2019) (holding that 
petitioner put forward a prima facie political asylum claim after 
providing credible testimony about being attacked and 
threatened for supporting a specific political party). 
 15 
 
B.  Guzman’s Application for Relief under the CAT  
 Article 3 of the CAT prohibits signatory parties to the 
Convention, including the United States, from expelling, 
returning, or extraditing a person to another country where 
“there are substantial grounds for believing that [that person] 
would be in danger of being subjected to torture.”  We have 
held that for an act to constitute torture, it must (1) cause severe 
physical or mental pain or suffering, (2) be intentionally 
inflicted, (3) be done for an illicit or proscribed purpose, (4) 
occur by or at the instigation of or with the consent or 
acquiescence of a public official who has custody or physical 
control of the victim, and (5) not arise from lawful sanctions.34  
To establish acquiescence, an applicant must demonstrate that, 
prior to the activity constituting torture, a public official was 
aware of it and thereafter breached his or her legal 
responsibility to intervene to prevent it.35  Where the 
government does not have actual knowledge of the activity 
constituting torture, a petitioner may meet this standard by 
showing that the government is willfully blind to it.36 
 
 In Myrie, we laid out a two-part test for both torture and 
acquiescence.  To determine whether a petitioner has met the 
burden of establishing that it is more likely than not that he 
would be tortured if removed, the IJ must ask (1) what is likely 
to happen to the petitioner if removed and (2) whether what is 
likely to happen amounts to torture.37  To determine whether 
 
34 Auguste v. Ridge, 395 F.3d 123, 135 (3d Cir. 2005). 
35 8 C.F.R. § 1208.18(a)(7). 
36 Silva-Rengifo v. Att’y Gen., 473 F.3d 58, 65 (3d Cir. 2007), 
as amended (Mar. 6, 2007). 
37 Myrie, 855 F.3d at 516. 
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the applicant has established that public officials will acquiesce 
to the torture, the IJ must ask (1) how public officials will likely 
act in response to the harm the petitioner fears and (2) whether 
the likely response from public officials qualifies as 
acquiescence.38  Whereas the first part of both inquiries is 
factual, the second part of both inquiries is legal.39 
 
 In affirming the IJ’s denial of Guzman’s CAT 
application, the BIA made two points in support of the IJ’s 
determination that Guzman had not shown that he was likely 
to be tortured upon removal.  First, it noted that Teco has since 
died.  Second, it suggested that other gang members may not 
have a continuing interest in Guzman and are unlikely to 
torture him since they had twice allowed Guzman to leave.  
Thus, without engaging in any acquiescence analysis, the BIA 
stopped at either step one or two of the torture analysis after 
concluding that nothing that amounts to torture is likely to 
happen to Guzman.  This conclusion is erroneous.   
 
To reiterate, we owe no deference to factual findings 
and conclusions when they are based on “inferences or 
presumptions that are not reasonably grounded in the record, 
viewed as a whole.”40  It is clear to us, viewing the record as a 
whole, that Guzman suffered torture.  Guzman’s credible 
testimony indicates that members of MS-13 tracked down and 
assaulted him on two separate occasions after he was seen 
talking to the police.  The severity of his treatment escalated as 
he was held at gunpoint on the second occasion.  These 
encounters with MS-13 members also directly contributed to 
 
38 Id. at 516–17. 
39 Id. 
40 Espinosa-Cortez, 607 F.3d at 107. 
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his PTSD diagnosis.  In other words, Guzman suffered both 
physical and psychological harm at the hands of MS-13, 
intentionally inflicted for the purpose of silencing him or 
punishing him.   
 
 It is also clear to us that Guzman is more likely than not 
to suffer the same treatment if he is removed to El Salvador.  
Teco was not the only one to have tracked down and assaulted 
Guzman.  Despite Teco’s death, there are other MS-13 
members who have seen and know of Guzman.  Pelón, for one, 
is presumably still alive and could again put a gun to Guzman’s 
head.  Others may have a personal stake in the matter if they 
were involved in the murder of Guzman’s neighbors.  In 
addition, Guzman’s claims that MS-13 members have been 
looking for him are not disputed. The BIA brushes these facts 
and reasonable inferences aside and suggests, in effect, that 
Guzman should try his luck a third time.  We disagree.     
 
We have made clear that while the IJ and the BIA need 
not discuss every piece of evidence in the record, they are 
required to consider “all evidence relevant to the possibility of 
future torture” and they “may not ignore evidence favorable to 
the alien.”41  We emphasize that principle again today because 
we are troubled by the BIA’s apparent distortion of evidence 
favorable to Guzman in this case.   
 
One final point, the government of El Salvador had 
recognized that witnesses to crimes need protection and has 
enacted a program to protect witnesses during the investigation 
 
41 Quinteros v. Att’y Gen., 945 F.3d 772, 786 (3d Cir. 2019) 
(internal quotation marks omitted). 
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and trial of a case.42  Unfortunately, this program has 
apparently been limited to protection during trial and has even 
then been ineffective and underfunded.  Witnesses are still 
threatened and attacked.43  It is clear that this program is not 
sufficient to provide the protection to Guzman required to 
satisfy the CAT.   
 
We will thus reverse the BIA’s determination with 
respect to whether Guzman is likely to face torture upon 
removal and remand this case to the BIA to determine whether 
Guzman can show it is more likely than not that Salvadoran 
officials will consent to or acquiesce in his torture. 
 
III.  CONCLUSION 
 Having concluded that the BIA erred in dismissing 
Guzman’s application for relief under the INA and the CAT, 
we will grant the petition for review, vacate the BIA’s removal 
order, and remand this case to the BIA for further proceedings 
consistent with this opinion.   
 
42 Decreto No. 1029/2006, Ley Especial para la Proteccion de 
Victimas y Testigos [Special Law for the Protection of Victims 
and Witnesses], (May 11, 2006) at 2, available at 
https://www.asamblea.gob.sv/sites/default/files/documents/de
cretos/171117_072930683_archivo_documento_legislativo.p
df (stating that the law applies to victims, witnesses, or other 
persons who are at risk or in danger due to their direct or 
indirect intervention in the investigation of a crime). 
43 Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, Issue Paper, El 
Salvador:  Information Gathering Mission Report, AR 402-03 
(2016). 
